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REASONING THROUGH CLASHES
BETWEEN RELIGION AND EQUALITY:
CASE LAW, SKEPTICS, AND SOCIAL
COHERENCE
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN EGALITARIAN AGE.
Nelson Tebbe.1 Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 2017. Pp. x + 288. $39.95 (Hardcover).
Michael A. Helfand2
I.

INTRODUCTION

One of the few widely shared views regarding contemporary
clashes between law and religion is that we are in a state of “deep
contestation,”3 as increasing degrees of social, political and legal
polarization have become the norm.4 Concern over this
increasingly deep social division and political polarization has
been particularly salient of late. Thus, the admixture of the
constitutional recognition of same-sex marriage,5 litigation
surrounding the Affordable Care Act’s “contraception
mandate,”6 and claims for religious accommodation from laws
that violate faith commitments has created a highly fraught legal
environment. And this has led scholars to worry that
disagreements have become so deep that there may not even be a
way for those who differ to reason about these matters
collectively. In the somewhat depressing words of John Inazu,
1. Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
2. Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law; Co-Director
Diane and Guilford Glazer Institute for Jewish Studies.
3. Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby Moment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 154 (2014).
4. See generally Thomas C. Berg, Religious Accommodation and the Welfare State,
38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 103 (2015); Andrew Koppelman, Gay Rights, Religious
Accommodations, and the Purposes of Antidiscrimination Law, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 619
(2015).
5. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
6. See, e.g., Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
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“These deep and often irresolvable differences call into question
our constitutional aspiration for ‘a more perfect union,’ our
national metaphor of a great ‘melting pot,’ and the promise of our
nation’s seal, E pluribus unum (‘Out of many, one’).”7
Given the state of affairs, it is not surprising to now see
scholarly works that not only attempt to resolve conflicts between
law and religion, but that also aim to provide a method for how
those from deeply divided viewpoints might reason about these
conflicts.8 Nelson Tebbe’s recent book, Religious Freedom in an
Egalitarian Age, is one such work and a masterful one at that. As
Tebbe notes at the very outset of his book, “[m]any American[s]
sense that they are living through a period of intense conflict
between religious freedom and equality law” (p. 1).
The book itself aims to provide a method for reasoning about
these deep conflicts, what Tebbe refers to as social coherence.
Drawing from John Rawls’s reflective equilibrium method, Tebbe
asks participants to reason about concrete dilemmas between
religion and equality, and then compare those resolutions about
concrete dilemmas to build a coherent vision for addressing these
types of conflicts. Tebbe then engages in this very type of
reasoning to address a wide range of conflicts between religion
and equality, including clashes over anti-discrimination laws in
areas such as public accommodations and employment as well as
debates over religious exemptions for public officials and
government support of religion and religious institutions.
The book itself is extraordinary in its ambition, erudition,
and scope. Tebbe covers vast areas of constitutional law
seamlessly, bringing the reader on a rich journey through the
multiple spheres of law, politics, and moral reasoning relevant to
the topics addressed in his book. This is, in many ways, far from
surprising. Tebbe is one of the most talented and highly regarded
experts in the law and religion field, and Religious Freedom in an
Egalitarian Age reflects that expertise. The book is a must-read
for all those who are working through questions of religious
freedom, equality, and the relationship between church and state.
Tebbe’s proposals for how the law ought to resolve these tense
conflicts reflect his wisdom, knowledge, and ability to identify a
7. JOHN D. INAZU, CONFIDENT PLURALISM: SURVIVING AND THRIVING
THROUGH DEEP DIFFERENCE 4 (2016).
8. Indeed, John Inazu’s book is one such attempt. See id.
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“careful approach” that “appreciates the power of arguments on
both sides” that “can provide a stable, defensible foundation for
the future of both free exercise and anti-discrimination law” (p.
5).
This review aims to assess Tebbe’s ultimate success in this
ambitious project: that is, has Tebbe provided a useful and
successful method for reasoning about these “intense conflicts”
between religion and equality? All told, the review identifies
some challenges for Tebbe’s method. To be sure, no attempt to
navigate such conflicts will be immune from criticism and Tebbe’s
framework has much to commend. The comments below
therefore represent some questions for Tebbe’s framework and
some thoughts on where more discussion might be necessary to
shore up the social coherence method as articulated by Tebbe.
II. PLURALISM, SKEPTICISM, AND THE PURPOSE OF
SOCIAL COHERENCE
Tebbe begins Religious Freedom in an Egalitarian Age with
an explanation of the motivation behind the project. Tebbe notes
the convergence among law and religion scholars that the doctrine
is fundamentally “messy”—that is, legal decisions and choices
related to religious freedom flow from a contorted amalgamation
of multiple considerations, values, and principles. And these
different pieces to the religious freedom present, at least
superficially, a broader picture of irrationality and
indeterminateness to the doctrine.
In highlighting this convergence, Tebbe draws upon the work
of two groups of scholars, groups he terms “pluralists” and
“skeptics.” He classifies pluralists as those “who embrace the idea
that multiple values are needed to account for correct judgments
across the entire range of religious freedom cases” (p. 7) and
includes such scholars as Kent Greenawalt, Marc DeGirolami,
Alan Brownstein, Steven Shiffrin, Paul Horwitz (p. 203 n.17), and,
apparently, Tebbe himself.9 But pluralism, in its use of different
values, considerations, and principles, explains Tebbe, has
become vulnerable to the growing criticism of skeptics across the

9. This is apparent throughout Religious Freedom in an Egalitarian Age, but is also
a characterization that Tebbe appears to have previously applied to his prior work. See
Nelson Tebbe, Religion and Social Coherentism, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 363, 365 (2015)
(describing some of his previous work as employing a “polyvalent method”).
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political spectrum. As described by Tebbe, “Skeptics have been
arguing not only that the jurisprudence on religious freedom is
messy . . . but further that the law is inherently or necessarily
patternless” (p. 5). Tebbe is quick to note that these skeptics do
not advocate discarding the prevailing religious freedom
enterprise, but instead encourage the law to “muddle through,
seeking modus vivendi solutions without any hope of principled
results” (p. 6). In this way, Tebbe notes that, ultimately, the
proposals of skeptics and pluralists for addressing “ground-level
conflict” are quite similar—employing a significant dose of
pragmatics and “all-things-considered judgements” (p. 7)—even
as they derive from somewhat divergent philosophical
underpinnings. But this convergence, according to Tebbe, cannot
mask the fundamental challenge of skeptics to pluralists. If a
pluralist approach to religious freedom is to truly thrive, it must
answer the charge of irrationality. And it is to this project that
Religious Freedom in an Egalitarian Age is, in large part,
dedicated.
Thus, Tebbe dedicates the first section of his book to
outlining his methodological approach that is geared to meeting
the challenge of skepticism—that is, the inability to systemize
religion clause doctrine in any meaningful and principled way.
That method, which Tebbe first explored in a previous essay,10 is
social coherence. Tebbe describes this first section as “relatively
independent from the rest” of the book in that the latter sections
can be understood independently (p. 13), but it is ultimately
essential to appreciating Tebbe’s contribution to ongoing
religious freedom jurisprudence. On Tebbe’s account, the best
way to meet the existence of multiple and competing values at
stake in religious debates is to employ social coherence, which
asks us to mine our intuitions about how to navigate these plural
commitments in concrete cases and then reason, in a deliberative
fashion, from those concrete intuitions so that they increasingly
fit together.
Social coherence is thus a method that both utilizes a mode
of reasoning that encourages thinking through a prism of
coherence and also emphasizes the role of social dynamics in this
process of reasoning. Noting his indebtedness to John Rawls’s
theory of “reflective equilibrium,” Tebbe explains that when
10.

Id.
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people encounter new moral questions or dilemmas, “they
evaluate their convictions by asking whether they fit together with
each other” (p. 26). This process of assessing the fit of a person’s
various commitments is different than reasoning directly from
first principles and then applying them to concrete circumstances.
Instead, it requires vacillating between considered judgments
about concrete circumstances and general principles, thereby
reasoning in a manner that increases the degree of overall
coherence to our intuitions. In Tebbe’s words, this method can
help explicate the overall rationality of pluralist judgments by
“[o]scillating among judgments and principles,” thereby giving
“legal actors a way to reason through problems that are highly
intricate” (p. 30). Tebbe sees this approach as particularly useful
in clashes between religion and equality, which implicate a wide
range of considerations and values. In this way, Tebbe’s method
is an attempt to rehabilitate a pluralist approach to these legal
dilemmas.
Tebbe is careful to note a number of features of a coherence
approach to legal dilemmas. The first is that intuitions are meant
to reinforce each other; that is, we test our intuitions about
concrete cases by considering other similar cases to see if our
multiple intuitions paint a coherent picture. In what might be
viewed as a blockchain method of reasoning, the more our
intuitions fit together, the more confident we can become in our
outlook. By contrast, if the pieces of our intuitions fail to fit, it
requires evaluating them in light of each other.
A second important element of Tebbe’s theory is that a
coherence method will only generate outcomes that are
warranted or justified—as opposed to outcomes that are “real or
true” (p. 27). This is a function of the fact that Tebbe’s project
provides a mode of reasoning where individuals test their
intuitions against their own intuitions. It does not advocate for a
particular moral vision, just a method of moral reasoning that can
leverage our own intuitions into a vision for how to resolve legal
conflict. Thus, Tebbe notes: “religious freedom law leaves plenty
of room for disagreement. Actors will recommend different
solutions to a particular problem” (p. 30).
This second qualification does raise the worry that
conclusions derived through a method of coherence are ultimately
arbitrary, and therefore skeptics who see this area of law as an
amalgamation of arbitrary, indefinite, and sometimes
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contradictory considerations are ultimately correct. In Tebbe’s
view, this would be a mistake; when people generate outcomes
through coherence reasoning, “they are saying that the solution
coheres with their other constitutional commitments and that the
alternative does not” (p. 39). Of course, all this means is that
people can justify their conclusions based upon their own
constitutional commitments in other cases, rendering their
outcome still contingent and thus, to some extent, still grounded
in other personal beliefs. But at least any particular judgment is
proposed against the background of a systematic approach that
fits with a range of concrete and specific commitments. In this
way, Tebbe explains, the particular judgment is “backed by
reasons” and can be “rationally justified” (p. 40). Accordingly, the
skeptics’ charge of irrationality levelled against religious freedom
jurisprudence, and in particular pluralist approaches to that
jurisprudence, is ultimately unjustified.
Tebbe employs this method to great effect in Part III of the
book, titled “Applications,” where he evaluates the clash between
religion and equality in anti-discrimination law, focusing on both
public accommodations and employment law, as well as in cases
of government funding and subsidy of religion and religious
institutions. In each of these contexts, Tebbe outlines various
paradigms for assessing each case, using both larger theoretical
frameworks in conjunction with concrete cases to test the readers’
intuitions. For example, when it comes to public accommodations
laws that protect LGBT people, Tebbe outlines two paradigms:
religious exemptions from public accommodations laws that
protect other classifications and “conscience clauses” that allow
medical professionals to refuse participating in procedures that
conflict with their religious commitments (pp. 127-29). Tebbe
then toggles back and forth between those paradigms, outlining
his argument for why the analogy to civil rights laws, as opposed
to conscience clauses, is more apt. And to bolster this claim,
Tebbe engages the reader with three concrete cases implicating
public accommodations laws: one regarding religious facilities
open to the public, one regarding religiously affiliated adoption
agencies, and one regarding the high-profile cases of businesses
refusing to provide their services at same-sex weddings. Using
those cases to triangulate around a set of cohesive legal
conclusions, Tebbe provides his approach for how courts should
evaluate claims for religious exemption to public
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accommodations laws, an approach that ultimately encourages
courts to reject those claims for exemption (pp 136-38).11
In these chapters, Religious Freedom in an Egalitarian Age is
at its very best. It provides methodological guidance to leverage
how people think about complex cases that pit the competing
values of religion and equality against each other. To be sure, the
reader might very well quibble—or outright disagree—with
Tebbe’s conclusions.12 But Tebbe is fully aware of that possibility,
regularly noting that his method of social coherence does not
justify only one outcome to these dilemmas. Tebbe simply hopes
the book provides a method for reasoning about these dilemmas
that embraces the existence of multiple values, and demonstrates
how people can provide justified and warranted reasons for
reaching a particular outcome notwithstanding—or, in fact,
maybe because of—these competing values that often pull each
person in opposite directions. In this regard, Religious Freedom in
an Egalitarian Age is an unequivocal success.
III. PRINCIPLES, CASES AND THE APPLICATION OF
SOCIAL COHERENCE
The book, however, has another section, sandwiched
between the first part on method and the third part on
applications. In this second section, Tebbe aims to answer the
question “What principles should guide our thinking about
conflicts between religious freedom and equality law?” (p. 49).
Drawing from his pluralist orientation, Tebbe identifies “four
primary commitments that run through defensible constitutional
decisions in this area” (p. 49): avoiding harm to others, fairness to
others, freedom of association, and government nonendorsement. For each of these principles, Tebbe articulates both
their nature and origin, providing some helpful examples so as to
flesh out what they each entail as a matter of concrete
commitment in practice.

11. For more on the particulars of how Tebbe applies his theory to contemporary
conflicts between religion and equality, see Sarah Barringer Gordon, The Value of
Moderation, Tebbe-Style, JOTWELL (Oct. 25, 2017), https://conlaw.jotwell.com/the-valueof-moderation-tebbe-style/.
12. Nathan Chapman’s review of Religious Freedom in an Egalitarian Age focused
on this form of criticism. Nathan S. Chapman, Is There a Rawlsian Solution to Conflicts
over Religious Liberty?, LAW & LIBERTY (Oct. 16, 2017), http://www.libertylawsite.org/
book-review/is-there-a-rawlsian-solution-to-conflicts-over-religious-liberty/.
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Especially given his pluralist orientation, Tebbe is
exceedingly careful to note that by identifying these four primary
commitments he is not “denying that there may be others” (p. 49).
But the list is, at first glance, somewhat curious, in that no
principle or value that is specific to religion makes the top-four
cut. Thus, there is nothing about the value of religious experience,
the importance of faith to identity formation, the principle of
religious freedom, or anything else that captures the unique value
of religion within the context of clashes between religion and
equality. This might make some wonder how Tebbe will be able
to make good on his promise to provide “a proposal that
appreciates the power of arguments on both sides,” and thereby
“provide a stable, defensible foundation for the future of both
free exercise and antidiscrimination law” (p. 5).
This omission, however, is by design and represents one of
the foundational commitments of Religious Freedom in An
Egalitarian Age. As expressed in his discussion of the fairness to
others principle, Tebbe maintains that government provision of
religious accommodations—but withholding those same
accommodations from those with similar, but secular objections—
“risks a particular kind of unfairness. . . . that kind of partiality
[that] may harm the right of others to equal citizenship” (p. 72).
Indeed, as Tebbe notes in his discussion of freedom of association,
associational protections should not be made “specific to religious
community groups,” but should be extended to secular groups as
well (p. 93). Thus, Tebbe provides his take on a growing and twofold philosophical debate over the specialness of religion. The first
threshold question implicated in this debate is whether religion is
special and therefore deserving of special legal treatment.13 And
among those rejecting religion’s specialness, the debate then turns
to whether the law should level the playing field by granting
analogous secular commitments the same status as religion—to

13. Compare BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? (2013) (arguing against
religion’s special status), and Micah Schwartzman, What If Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1351, 1427 (2012) [hereinafter Schwartzman, Not Special] (same), with
Andrew Koppelman, Religion’s Specialized Specialness: A Response to Micah
Schwartzman, What If Religion Is Not Special?; 79 U. Chi. L. Rev 1351 (2012), 79 U. CHI.
L. REV. 71 (2013) (arguing that religion serves as a useful proxy to promote important
goods and thereby deserves special treatment), and Christopher C. Lund, Religion Is
Special Enough, 103 VA. L. REV. 481 (2017) (arguing that religion promotes a range of
important values, justifying its unique legal status).
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“level up,” so to speak14—or whether the law should level the
playing field by dismantling the special protections granted
religion—to “level down,” so to speak.15 Framed in this way,
Tebbe both discounts the specialness of religion, but advocates a
legal strategy of leveling up so that secular commitments
analogous to religion receive the same degree of protection.
From a philosophical perspective, Tebbe’s view on the
specialness of religion doesn’t stand out. It is a well-travelled
approach to a complex philosophical question related to the status
of religion and religious accommodation claims. But the claim is
somewhat peculiar when considered in the context of Tebbe’s
overall project of social coherence. To see how, consider what
Tebbe articulates as one of the chief challenges levelled by
skeptics against social coherence.
According to Tebbe, the fact that his social coherence
method only produces warranted or justified outcomes leads to
the skeptics’ challenge that the outcomes are too subjective or
individualistic. Tebbe provides an example of this worry:
“Imagine a white supremacist who is internally consistent, or a
male chauvinist who believes he has a coherent worldview that
includes the Constitution. Surely such people cannot claim to
have views that are rationally justified” (p. 43). And yet, social
coherence, which asks people to build a theory whose rationality
derives from the internal consistency of concrete judgments
across a range of cases, seems at first glance without the resources
to reject the claims of the racist or chauvinist as unjustifiable.
To respond, Tebbe leans heavily on the social aspect of his
coherence theory. According to Tebbe, the social aspect means
that individuals rely on all sorts of precedent—including legal,
political, and social forms of precedent—within their reasoning
process. These forms of precedent, Tebbe explains, “shape not
only their interests but also their information—the facts and
arguments that they consider when they work through some new
problem” (p. 31). Among other consequences, highlighting the
social component of social coherence “bolsters the method’s
appropriateness for constitutional law, which draws part of its
legitimacy from responsiveness to popular will” (p. 32).
14. See, e.g., Micah Schwartzman, Religion as a Legal Proxy, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
1085 (2014).
15. See, e.g., LEITER, supra note 13, at 94–100.
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In turn, Tebbe argues that for a conclusion related to
constitutional law to be warranted within a social coherence
framework, it “must take into account precedents and principles
that are authoritative among contemporary American jurists” (p.
43). Thus, the arguments deployed by the racist and male
chauvinist fail because “their claims are incoherent as
interpretations of the Constitution because they contravene basic
legal principles” (p. 43). For a claim to be warranted under a social
coherence framework, a person must “assimilate uncontroverted
features of the jurisprudence” (p. 43). So, for example, “[t]hose
features include not only the text and history of the Equal
Protection Clause,” but also “precedents like Brown v. Board of
Education in the race context and parallel decisions that render
discrimination legally suspect in the gender context” (p. 43). In
this way, the ideologies of the racist and male chauvinist are
“unjustified understandings of American law” (p. 43) and
therefore cannot be considered warranted.
The role of legal precedent as a side constraint within the
social coherence framework is of vital importance to
understanding Tebbe’s project. The purpose of the framework is
to provide a method that can respond to the skeptics who view
religious freedom jurisprudence as irrational and indeterminate.
Tebbe’s response is that using concrete judgements to build a
unified vision for how to resolve conflicts between religion and
equality can generate rational and warranted conclusions. But this
response is threatened by the rejoinder of subjectivity—that is,
can we truly view social coherence as generating rational and
warranted responses simply because the responses are internally
consistent? It is to address this rejoinder of the skeptics that
Tebbe leans heavily on the body of constitutional law, including
its texts and legal decisions. Thus, using a social coherence
framework to address questions of constitutional law requires
being part of the project of constitutional law. And that project,
what is ultimately a social project, entails remaining true to the
“uncontroverted features of the jurisprudence,” which include
Supreme Court precedents that are “authoritative among
contemporary American jurists” (p. 43).
Understanding the role of precedents in Tebbe’s scheme
helps explain why Supreme Court decisions play such a prominent
role in the story he tells about the principles that animate his
vision of religious freedom and equality law. Articulating such
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principles could have simply been done on the level of
philosophical and moral theory. But doing so would be to miss the
critical role of law and legal decisions in Tebbe’s method. Without
these decisions as pegs in the coherence framework, the entire
project slides towards the skeptic’s allegation of subjectivity.
Indeed, one of the unique features of Tebbe’s analysis is that,
with the exception of Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, he does not
expressly disagree with any Supreme Court precedent. This is
apparently because it is important that the principles he describes
not be merely “vague ideals or aspirations,” but that “[t]hey have
the status of constitutional law” (p. 49). That is part of staving off
the skeptic’s critique. Thus, in his chapter on the principle of
avoiding harm to others, Tebbe doesn’t criticize Supreme Court
opinions that might be taken to undermine the principle; instead,
he distinguishes them. For example, Tebbe argues that
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter Day Saints v. Amos, which upheld the constitutionality
of the exemption that allows religious organizations to
discriminate on the basis of religion in employment,16 can be
understood as fully consonant with the principle of avoiding harm
to others; that is because it can be understood as a case allowing
some degree of harm to others when the religiously-motivated
employer is a “church [or] closely affiliated non-profit[] that [is]
not engaged in significant commercial activities” (p. 57). This
special treatment of certain religious organizations stems from the
fact that “employees are normally on notice that the religious
organization is limited to members of the church” (p. 56).
This penchant for distinguishing and affirming—as opposed
to expressly rejecting—existing constitutional case law appears
consistently throughout the book. An extreme example is Tebbe’s
treatment of the Supreme Court’s decision in Town of Greece v.
Galloway, in which the Court upheld the town board’s practice of
hosting a prayer at their monthly meeting.17 Tebbe discusses
Town of Greece in the context of the principle of government nonendorsement (pp. 102-03). The Court’s decision in Town of
Greece does not fit well with Tebbe’s overall judgment that “the
paradigmatic example of government speech that violates the
Constitution is endorsement of religion” (p. 102). Tebbe fully
16. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
17. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014).
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recognizes this, describing the endorsement test as “besieged,”
noting that the test went “unsupported” in Town of Greece (p.
102).
But Tebbe refuses to allow the Town of Greece decision to
change his assessment of the current status of constitutional law:
“Still, the best understanding of constitutional law is that
meaningful boundaries continue to limit government
endorsement of religion” (p. 102). And in his attempt to maintain
that government non-endorsement still represents the best
characterization of where the Supreme Court’s constitutional
jurisprudence currently stands—as opposed to where he thinks it
ought to be—Tebbe shoehorns the case into his overall principle
of government non-endorsement, suggesting that Town of Greece
“arguably retained the premise that if the scheme had promoted
a religion . . . then it would have run up against the Establishment
Clause” (pp. 102-03).18
This is a stretch that would at first glance seem unnecessary.
Constitutional law scholarship is replete with articles and books
simply arguing that the Supreme Court got certain cases wrong.19
But Tebbe appears, at times, to go to great lengths in order to
avoid making such pronouncements. The logic driving such a
tactic is understandable once the reader realizes that social
coherence needs, at least for the most part, to uphold Supreme
Court case law so that constitutional text and constitutional
precedent can serve as a side constraint, allowing Tebbe’s method
to adequately respond to the skeptic who could otherwise view
social coherence as too individualistic to generate conclusions that
are rational or warranted. Put differently, maybe Tebbe’s
reluctance to reject Town of Greece stems from the following
concern: if Tebbe can simply assert that Town of Greece is
wrongly decided, then the male chauvinist or racist can simply
assert that the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence is
wrongly decided. Thus, while much constitutional scholarship
18. Paul Horwitz’s review of Religious Freedom in an Egalitarian Age has noted this
peculiar treatment of Town of Greece as well, although he does not explore the issue in the
broader context of Tebbe’s social coherence method. See Paul Horwtiz, Both Sides Have
Their Reasons, COMMONWEAL (October 4, 2017), https://www.commonwealmagaz
ine.org/both-sides-have-their-reasons.
19. For example, in the popular press, I have taken such a position—that Town of
Greece is wrongly decided. See Michael A. Helfand, America Doesn’t See Its Religious
Minorities, THE FORWARD (May 23, 2014), https://forward.com/opinion/198368/americadoesn-t-see-its-religious-minorities/.
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simply rejects Supreme Court decisions as wrongly decided, it
does so because the authors develop theories based upon firstorder principles and then impose those principles in a top-down
fashion on existing caselaw; Tebbe’s theory hopes to generate
warranted judgments based on bottom-up concrete judgments
drawn from particular constitutional dilemmas and principles.
Case law’s side-constraint function in Tebbe’s theory appears
to result in other somewhat uneven applications. When it comes
to his critique of Burwell v. Hobby Lobby—the one decision
described as unjustified, even if not “necessarily unjustifiable” (p.
69)—Tebbe is careful to emphasize that the principle of avoiding
harm to others still retained a majority of justices (p. 68). Thus,
Tebbe carefully counts five justices that endorsed the avoid-harmto-others principle, noting that Justice Kennedy’s concurrence
“removed” “any doubt” that the principle served as a premise of
the Hobby Lobby decision (p. 68). Indeed, Tebbe goes so far as
to suggest that, at least on the level of principle, avoiding harm to
others was embraced by all of the justices, although in so doing he
dismisses a footnote that indicates to the contrary in the Court’s
majority opinion as “implausible and unconvincing” (p. 68).
Accordingly, the true problem with Hobby Lobby is not, on
Tebbe’s reading, that the Court rejected the principle of avoiding
harm to others; it was that the Court’s decision envisioned a
remedy—the expansion of the religious exemption so that
employees would all receive contraception just not directly from
the employer’s insurance coverage—that was not retroactive. As
a result, the decision left a gap in coverage for some employees,
thereby highlighting the Court’s failure to condition its decision
on avoiding harm to others in practice (p. 68).
By contrast, when recounting the Supreme Court’s decision
in Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock—a decision that addressed a
Texas law that exempted religious publications from sales tax—
Tebbe focuses almost exclusively on Justice Brennan’s plurality
opinion, which provides important and significant support for the
principle of fairness to others. But the plurality opinion only gets
Tebbe to four, which he then attempts to supplement with Justice
Blackmun’s concurring opinion, an opinion also joined by Justice
O’Connor (p. 75). Blackmun’s concurrence, however, is
somewhat opaque. Tebbe emphasizes Blackmun’s conclusion that
“[a] statutory preference for the dissemination of religious ideas
offends our most basic understanding of what the Establishment
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Clause is all about”; at the same time, Blackmun also noted in his
concurrence that “some forms of accommodating religion are
constitutionally permissible,”20 at a minimum raising a question as
to whether Texas Monthly can be read as supporting the
“constitutional status” of the fairness to others principle. To be
sure, scholars have long disputed what to make of the Court’s
decision in Texas Monthly. The point here is that the social
coherence method, and its need to combat the skeptics’ critique
of subjectivism, appears to lead Tebbe to frame his principles as
all having “the status of constitutional law,” as opposed to merely
advancing a theory based on first-order principles as to why he
thinks that the dissent in Hobby Lobby is correct as is the plurality
in Texas Monthly. But that methodological need comes somewhat
at the expense of a consistent application of when we ought to
care about how many justices embraced specific overarching
principles.
As alluded to above, the most challenging tension between
the social coherence method and Tebbe’s reliance on case law
comes in his treatment of Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC, which
reaffirmed the “ministerial exception”—the constitutional rule
that congregations are shielded from liability under various antidiscrimination laws when they hire and fire clergy, and potentially
other employees integral to the congregations’ religious mission
(p. 57). Indeed, as Tebbe notes in his discussion of freedom of
association, associational protections should not be made
“specific to religious community groups,” but should be extended
to secular groups as well (p. 93). Thus, reconciling the principles
of avoiding harm to others, freedom of association, and fairness
to others, Tebbe advocates modifying anti-discrimination law by
levelling up so as “to make its provisions equally available to
sacred and secular organizations” (p. 95), characterizing
Hosanna-Tabor as a case where “freedom of association prevails
over the principle of avoiding harm to others” (p. 57).
The problem with this assessment of Hosanna-Tabor is that
it appears to conflict with the substance of the Court’s unanimous
decision. The case addressed the claims of Cheryl Perich, a fourthgrade teacher at a church-operated school, that her employer
violated her rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act.21
20. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 28 (1989) (Blackmun J., concurring).
21. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171
(2012).
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The employer, however, claimed that it was shielded from liability
by the ministerial exception because Perich was a “called
teacher.”22 Perich and the EEOC, in pressing the case, argued that
whatever protections were afforded religious institutions by the
First Amendment stemmed from the freedom of association and
not the religion clauses.23 Thus, as characterized by the Court,
“[t]he EEOC and Perich . . . see no need—and no basis—for a
special rule for ministers grounded in the Religion
Clauses themselves.”24
The Court, however, rejected Perich’s claims and specifically
attacked this argument. According to the Court,
We find this position untenable. . . . It follows under the
EEOC’s and Perich’s view that the First Amendment analysis
should be the same, whether the association in question is the
Lutheran Church, a labor union, or a social club. That result is
hard to square with the text of the First Amendment itself,
which gives special solicitude to the rights of religious
organizations.25

Now it is completely reasonable to disagree with this
conclusion as being philosophically unsound. Many critics of
granting religious claims special legal status have done just that—
attacked this argument as philosophically incoherent.26 But to
characterize the principle of fairness to others as a “constitutional
commitment” (p. 71) and having “the status of constitutional law”
(p. 49) would seem, at least without some discussion or
qualification, to mis-describe the current state of the Supreme
Court’s religion clause jurisprudence.27 Indeed, in Hosanna-Tabor
there aren’t even any concurrences or dissents upon which to hang
the proverbial hat; the opinion was unanimous and seems to, at a
bare minimum, discount the fairness to others principle, given
22. Id. at 699–700, 708 (differentiating “called teachers”—teachers “called to their
vocation by God through a congregation”—from “contract teachers”—teachers
“appointed by the school board without a vote of the congregation”).
23. See Oral Argument at 37:22-25, Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. 171 (“We don’t see that
line of church autonomy principles in the Religion Clause jurisprudence as such. We see it
as a question of freedom of association.”).
24. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 189.
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., LEITER, supra note 13; Schwartzman, Not Special, supra note 13.
27. Moreover, and without going into detail here, the current state of the Supreme
Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence would also seem to manifest a view that
religion is subject to special treatment—a view that is, of course, subject to philosophical
criticism.
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that Tebbe formulates the principles as follows: “government
favoritism on the basis of religion risks a particular kind of
unfairness. . . . that kind of partiality may harm the right of others
to equal citizenship” (p. 72). That formulation does not, at least in
an obvious way, fit with the Court’s decision in Hosanna-Tabor.
To reiterate, Tebbe could conclude that the Court’s decision
in Hosanna-Tabor was wrongly decided. But given that Supreme
Court case law apparently serves as an essential side constraint in
the social coherence framework—preventing social coherence
from sliding into subjectivism—one understands his reluctance to
do so. For Tebbe, warranted constitutional interpretations “must
assimilate uncontroverted features of the jurisprudence” (p. 43).
Now one of the challenges when assessing the role of Supreme
Court decisions in the social coherence method is that Tebbe does
not quite provide a framework for what counts as an
“uncontroverted feature[] of the jurisprudence.” It therefore
leaves open the possibility that if in the context of equal
protection, “[t]hose features include not only the text and history
of the Equal Protection Clause, but precedents like Brown v.
Board of Education” (p. 43), then it might also be true, given that
it was unanimously decided, that uncontroverted features of the
jurisprudence also include not only the text and history of the
religion clauses, but precedents like Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC.
Of course, Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC is not Brown v. Board
of Education. Accordingly, maybe Tebbe has a theory working in
the background of his assessments that privileges some
constitutional precedents over others—maybe even some sort of
view of “super-precedents”28—such that some cases are, on his
view, far more fundamental to constitutional law and
jurisprudence, and therefore far more “authoritative among
contemporary American jurists” (p. 43). But, as already noted,
Religious Freedom in an Egalitarian Age doesn’t provide much in
terms of explanation on this point to help the reader flesh out
which decisions do and don’t count as “uncontroverted features
of the jurisprudence” (p. 43). Moreover, if there are some cases
28. The concept of super-precedents entered public debate during the confirmation
hearings of Justice John Roberts. See Jeffrey Rosen, So, Do You Believe in
‘Superprecedent’?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2005, at C1. It has also been a topic of significant
discussion in the scholarly literature. See, e.g., Michael Sinclair, Precedent, SuperPrecedent, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 363 (2007); Michael J. Gerhardt, Super Precedent, 90
MINN. L. REV. 1204 (2006); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J. L. & ECON. 249, 251 (1976).
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that have garnered insufficient support to qualify as necessary
features of the constitutional enterprise—such that disagreement
with them would not render someone’s interpretations as
illegitimate “understanding[s] of the United States constitution”
(p. 43)—then it remains a wonder that Tebbe does not simply
dismiss cases like Town of Greece v. Galloway and HosannaTabor v. EEOC as wrongly decided.
More likely is that Tebbe’s commitment to social
coherence—and its ability to respond to charges of subjectivism—
requires that he not unsettle too much constitutional case law. For
without that anchor, the social element in the social coherence
framework might not be able to generate warranted or rational
judgments that do not fall prey to claims of indeterminacy.
However, Tebbe’s understandable reluctance to reject
constitutional decisions—and instead to massage tensions
between them and his primary principles—paints an
uncomfortable picture that leaves the reader wondering if there is
a principled way for Tebbe to read existing Supreme Court case
law.
IV. CONCLUSION
The criticisms of the last section notwithstanding, Tebbe’s
Religious Freedom in an Egalitarian Age is first-rate work that
should be read by anyone interested in questions of religious
freedom and equality law. Ultimately, the drawbacks of Tebbe’s
approach are a function of the project’s ambitious aims—to find a
way to reason about conflicts between religion and equality
without simply allowing debate to devolve into rancorous namecalling or bald assertions about how the law ought to decide.
Tebbe seeks to leverage our intuitions about concrete cases so
that we can build a bottom-up picture that accounts for the
multiple values at stake in any given case. This pluralist impulse is
to be lauded—indeed, I myself have endorsed something like it
elsewhere.29 But the cries of the skeptic still loom large in such an
approach, asking us whether our commitment to consistency and
fit can overcome the accusations of subjectivity. These questions

29. See, e.g., Michael A. Helfand, Implied Consent: A Primer and a Defense, 50
CONN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018); Michael A. Helfand, Religious Institutionalism,
Implied Consent, and the Value of Voluntarism, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 539 (2015).
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remain not just for Tebbe, but for any scholar of constitutional
theory and interpretation.

